


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
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ANALYSIS
OF THE
LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE.

BY
JAMES B. GREENOUGH.

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THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE.

IT is generally acknowledged that no satisfactory analysis of the Latin Subjunctive has yet been made, notwithstanding the great advance within the last few years of grammatical science in other directions. In fact, the Latin Grammar is much less rationally set forth than even the Greek. One cause of this is undoubtedly found in the difficulties attending the analysis of the *forms* of the modal system in the Indo-European languages, upon which any sound philosophy of the moods must finally rest, and this cause will probably disappear in the continued advance of grammatical science. There is, however, another cause which has also, I think, impeded the analysis of the forms themselves; which is, that, in the rational or logical analysis of the *uses* of the moods, a wrong method has been pursued from the beginning.

The attempt has been made to find in all the uses of the moods as they finally became developed in the flourishing period of the languages, and that too with each language separately, some underlying principle common to all the uses; an attempt which, as it seems to me, has been and must in the nature of things be futile. Sufficient allowance has not been made even by the comparative grammarians for the growth or development of constructions. It is obvious that in the meanings of words

and the uses of constructions, changes take place in course of time by which the original idea is entirely obscured. Now in the modal systems, however logically they may be used in any one language, it seems impossible to find in all the usages even of a single language any general principle which applies to them all. Nor is it at all probable, *a priori*, that a mood should be invented to express any general idea, such as a "subjective conception," "something contingent or hypothetical," or "a possibility," or "an idea less definite than the Indicative." In fact, it is almost inconceivable that a mood, as such, in the modern sense of that term should be invented at all. Wants of expression do not present themselves in this abstract, indefinite manner; and it is the want, in this as in other cases, that suggests the supply. Forms do not grow with the consciousness of those who use them. A special modification of the thought is wanted in a particular case, and a combination of words is made, empirically as it were, to express it. This form by usage becomes the idiom of the language, and having once been used is extended by analogy to other modes of thought in various directions, which may, in course of time, diverge widely from each other, though originally radiating from a common centre.

So was it, we must suppose, with the Latin Subjunctive, the Greek Subjunctive and Optative, and the Sanscrit Conjunctive and Potential. Just as *will, shall, may* in English, *avoir* and *aller* in French, came to be in many cases mere auxiliaries from being used experimentally with their proper force; just as *amatus est* came to mean "he has been loved" instead of "he is loved"; just as *habeo perspectum* came even in classical Latin to be hardly distinguishable from a simple perfect; so the syllable *ya* in the Indo-European languages, appended at first with its proper

meaning to the crude form of the verb *as*, *to be*, gradually became absorbed in the verb, producing *asy&lm*, meaning probably *I am going to be* originally; and so through the various changes in articulation the form *εἶναι* was developed in Greek, and *siem* and later *sim* in Latin, with all their various meanings. Now it is evident that the syllable *ya* and the corresponding *a* of the Vedic and Greek Subjunctive, whatever meaning we may assign to them, did not mean "subjective conception," or "an idea less definite than the Indicative." Each was added in some one case to express some special meaning, such as *going*, or *wishing*, and from those meanings all the existing meanings of the Optative and Subjunctive have in process of time and of thought been developed. The true problem of the Latin Subjunctive, then, is not what is its meaning, but from what meaning or use can all the later meanings and usages be naturally deduced. I am aware that the only really solid foundation for a theory on this subject is to be found in the meanings of the formative elements themselves which enter into the modal forms; yet, since these meanings have not been certainly ascertained, it seems to me that some assistance will be given to the analysis of the forms, and an advance made towards the true view of the Latin Subjunctive, if any meaning can be found from which the uses of the mood might be developed.

Now the only meaning that seems to be common to all the uses of the Subjunctive is that of futurity, and we may be led to suspect that the Subjunctive may be in its nature, or, at least in its origin, a FUTURE. The Present would correspond to a SIMPLE FUTURE, the Imperfect to a FUTURUM IN PRAETERITO, the Perfect to a FUTURE PERFECT, and the Pluperfect to a FUTURUM EXACTUM IN PRAETERITO.

Aside from the considerations which seem to support this view drawn from the constructions of the Subjunctive, there are some general facts that tend to show the close connection between the Future and the Modal System of the Indo-European languages.

The Futures of the third and fourth conjugations in Latin, are obviously forms of the original Optative, which have crowded out the regular Future, which is formed, as it appears in Greek, with a sibilant. Again, the forms of the Future Perfect Indicative and the Perfect Subjunctive in Latin, except in the first person, are absolutely identical; and, although this does not show that these forms have the same origin, or, at any rate, that they have been developed through the same process, which last is obviously not the case, yet it does show that they are kindred in meaning, and contain, ultimately, the same formative element. The accidental difference in the first person between *rim* and *ro* is of little account, inasmuch as the final *o* of verbs both in Latin and Greek represents an original *m*.

It is worth noticing, also, that Madvig was so impressed with the future meaning of the Perfect Subjunctive, that he makes it regularly a Future Perfect, and Zumpt calls it "also the Subjunctive of the Future Perfect."

So also Gellius, xviii. 2, raises the question, "*Scripserim,*" "*legerim,*" "*venerim,*" *cujus temporis verba sint, præteriti an futuri an utriusque?*

It is also one of the primary rules of the Greek Subjunctive that it always refers to future time (See Kühner Gr. Gr. § 259, 1). So likewise in the Epic dialect, the Subjunctive is used frequently in principal clauses both with and without *ἄν* where it is hardly possible to distinguish it from the later Future. (See Goodwin Gr. Moods and Tenses, § 87, and examples there cited.)

It is to be noticed that the kindred languages — the Gothic sometimes (Bopp *Vergl. Gr.* § 660, p. 911), the Bactrian usually (Schleicher *Comp. d. Ind. Spr.* § 298), and the Old Persian always (*ibid.*) — express the Future by the Subjunctive, having like the Latin lost the regular Indo-European Future.

It is not entirely without significance that the Subjunctive develops no Future Tense; and the Future Optative is comparatively rare, and occurs at all only in Greek, being probably developed through the influence of the indirect discourse. The Latin represents by the Present or Imperfect Subjunctive in indirect discourse both the Present and the Future Indicative of direct discourse.

We may consider also the fact that when the Subjunctive clause becomes again dependent (as when it is changed to the Infinitive, or follows *quin* or *ut*), when the same form is not retained, the idea is expressed by the Periphrastic conjugation with the participle in *rus*, which is certainly future in meaning.

E. g. De quo sic velim statuas me haec eadem sensurum fuisse si mihi integra omnia fuissent. C. Fam. 1, 9. (In direct this would be *sensissem*.) Adeoque inopiae est coactus Haunibal, ut nisi cum fugae specie abeundum timuisset, Galliam repetiturus fuerit. Livy, 22, 32 (without *ut*, *repetisset*). Neque ambigitur quin Brutus idem, qui tantum gloriae Superbo exacto rege meruit pessimo publico id facturum fuerit (for *fecisset* in direct). Livy, 2, 1. Si id facere voluisses . . . non dubito quin omnis ad te conversura se fuerit multitudo. C. Planc. 20. Quodsi extemplo rem fortunae commisisset, haud scio an magno detrimento certamen staturum fuerit. Justin. 22, 7.

Now how does this idea of a Future apply to the different constructions of the Latin Subjunctive?

PROTASIS AND APODOSIS.

That of the Protasis and Apodosis in its various forms naturally comes first, and as these forms of conditional sentences have never been satisfactorily set forth, we may be allowed to enumerate them.

First. The general and particular conditions, first noticed by Professor Goodwin (*Gr. Moods and Tenses*, § 48) in Greek, are also to some extent distinguished in Latin.

1. Of particular conditions. (*a.*) Those in which the supposition is present or past and no opinion is expressed as to its truth or falsity have only the Indicative.

(*b.*) Those present or past and impliedly contrary to fact take the Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctive in both clauses.

(*c.*) Future conditions appear of two kinds. If the supposition is to be vividly expressed (as likely to occur, for example), the Future Indicative is used in both clauses, but may be replaced by the Future Perfect in the Protasis if the condition may be conceived as completed before the conclusion begins. If the supposition is to be less vividly expressed (as improbable, or for any other reason), the Present Subjunctive is used in both clauses ; but the Perfect may take its place in Protasis in the same cases in which the Future Perfect Indicative stands for the Future.

(*d.*) All verbs denoting necessity, propriety, possibility, preference, and the like, may, and more commonly do, take the Indicative in either Present or Past tenses in Apodosis, when with other verbs the Subjunctive would be the proper form.

2. General conditions, both Present and Past, may take the Subjunctive in the Protasis alone, having in the Apodosis some form of the Indicative denoting a repeated

action or general truth. This construction is however by no means the regular one, as it is in Greek.

In any form of condition, a relative clause with an indefinite antecedent may stand for the Protasis.

The Protasis, or sometimes the Apodosis, may be implied by the context or entirely omitted.

Now how does the meaning we have suggested for the Subjunctive agree with these uses?

In Present and Past Particular Conditions of the kind first mentioned only the Indicative occurs, and these therefore do not come under discussion here. The first kind of Future Conditions, also, being expressed by the Future Indicative, are likewise excluded. It is in the second class of Future conditions, expressed by the Present or Perfect Subjunctive, that the idea of a Future most naturally finds a place; and it is most probable that this is one of the earliest uses of the Subjunctive. It is not of much consequence whether we consider the Protasis or the Apodosis to have originated first, inasmuch as one always implies the other, and it is natural that they should spring up simultaneously. Nor is it unnatural that the same form should be used in both clauses. The two ideas are both future and mutually dependent, and when the Indicative mood is used we find the same Future tense used in both. If the Protasis is completed before the Apodosis begins, then the Perfect Subjunctive is used in the first clause, and by the peculiar tendency of the Latin to represent a Future action as completed, the Perfect is often used in the Apodosis also. In this use the Perfect is only a Future Perfect in meaning.

E. g. Si a corona relictus sim . . . non queam dicere. C. Brut. 51. Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini? C. Off. 3, 6.

If the whole sentence is transferred to past time by becoming dependent upon a main clause in a past tense, the Imperfect and Pluperfect regularly take the place of the Present and Perfect, showing that those tenses express the same idea relatively to past time that the first do to present.

E. g. Propior . . . tumulus apparuit, ad quem capiendum si luce palam iretur quia haud dubie hostis . . . praevenitur erat, noctu clam missi Numidæ ceperunt. Livy, 22, 24. Independent of *apparuit*, this would be *Si eatur, praevenitur est* (for *praeveniat*).

Sed conjuges liberosque devehendos Carthaginem tradiderunt; fortius quidquid accideret laturi si carissimam sui partem extra communis periculi sortem habuissent. Q Curt. 4, 3.

Here *Ferant* . . . *accidat* . . . *si habuerint* are absorbed in the main clause and transferred to past time. The same thing happens in indirect discourse regularly, but from the universal use of the Subjunctive in that construction, it cannot be ascertained with certainty in any particular case, whether an Imperfect or Pluperfect Subjunctive stands for a Present or Perfect of that mood, or for a Future or Future Perfect Indicative.

So with such examples as :

Caesar qui cogere posset, Si peteret per amicitiam patris atque suam, non quicquam proficeret; si collibisset, ab ovo usque ad mala citaret, Io Bacche! Hor. Sat. 1, 3, 4.

Here *peteret*, &c. are used of time past precisely as *petat*, &c. would be if he were speaking of Tigellius as now having the fault complained of in the passage. There is obviously no idea of the falsity of the supposition. These cases are rare, because, as will hereafter be explained, usually this form of condition implies its own falsity.

The case seems a little different in the usual construction of the Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctive in Protasis and

Apodosis contrary to fact. This use is, however, easily seen to be the same in origin. These tenses are only the Present and Perfect transferred to past time with the same (relatively) future signification.

"If I should wish, I should do so," transferred to past time becomes "If I *was* going to wish, I should be about to do so." In this case, however, the time for the happening of the condition has, at the time of the writer, already passed in most cases, so that if the condition remains such, it is seen to be a mere supposition contrary to the fact. Moreover, in this case, the time for the happening of the condition may be any time relatively future to the past time referred to, and so may be and usually is assumed to be the absolute present. Hence the Imperfect, in this use, most commonly refers to present time. The case is the same with the Pluperfect, except that the supposed future action is represented as completed at the relatively future time referred to. Hence, naturally the Pluperfect refers to time absolutely past. The transition from a supposed future case to a condition contrary to fact is readily perceived in such sentences as

Conclave illud, ubi erat mansurus, si ire perrexisset proxima nocte corruit. C. Div. 1, 15.

Strictly, this is *Est mansurus si perrexerit* transferred to the past, so that it means, "*He was going to stop if he should continue (lit. have continued) his journey.*" In fact, however, it amounts to no more than "*would have stopped if he had continued his journey.*"

So also where the apodosis becomes dependent in indirect discourse.

E. g. Stantes plaudebant in re ficta, quid arbitramur in vera fuisse facturos? C. Am. 7. Titinius clamitabat neque aliter Carnutes interficiendi Tasgetii consilium fuisse capturos, neque Eburones,

si Caesar adesset, tanta cum contemptione nostri ad castra venturos esse. Caes. B. G. 1, 34.

Compare

Quid enim futurum fuit si . . . illa . . . plebs . . . agitari coepta esset. Livy, 2, 1.

Compare also the Indicative in Apodosis with verbs of propriety and the like, which is allowed only because these verbs have a future signification in themselves, or a general signification that includes the future.

E. g. Si verum respondere velles, haec erant dicenda. C. Fin. 4, 23.

This relation of the Protasis and Apodosis contrary to fact to the future still more clearly appears in the Sanscrit. In that language the conditional mood, which is the form specially appropriated to this construction, is formed directly from the Future by the same means as that by which the Imperfect is formed from the Present; namely, by prefixing the augment *a*, corresponding to *ε* in Greek, and using the secondary terminations.

E. g. Bhavishyâmi, I shall be; Abhavishyam, I should have been.

So that the parallelism is complete between an Imperfect of the Future, and a Potential (or Conditional Future) of the Imperfect, which the Imperfect Subjunctive is in the view of comparative grammarians. (See Schleicher, Vergl. Gram. § 301, 8.) This formation is late and rare, however; and better and nearer home, perhaps, is the French conditional which is used in the apodosis of this kind of conditions. *Aimerait* bears the same relation to *aimera* that *avait* bears to *a*; in fact, the former contain the latter as elements of formation.

This view accounts for the confusion existing in the use of the Imperfect, in the construction of Protasis contrary to fact, for both Present and Past conditions. It of course is not necessary that the relatively Future time supposed

should be the absolute Present; and hence, when a repeated or continued action is referred to in the Protasis, some part of it or even the whole may have already happened in the past; and the Imperfect then may denote a condition contrary to fact, which, if true, would be generally true at all times, or true in any one of a number of past cases.

E. g. Hic si mentis esset suae, ausus esset educere exercitum . . . ?
C. in Pis. 21. Accusator esses ridiculus si illis temporibus natus esses. C. Rosc. Am.

So, especially, in the indefinite *diceres, crederes, putares*, which are obviously only *dicas, &c.*, transferred to the past. In fact, in these the falsity of the Protasis is utterly unimportant, and it may be doubted whether it was felt to be implied. It must be remembered that the subject in these cases is indefinite, and does not refer to the person or any person addressed.

In general conditions there seems a difficulty from the fact that the main clause, the Apodosis, is present or past, while the Protasis, according to our view, must be future. Upon a careful examination, however, this apparent incongruity vanishes. The very fact that the condition is general, shows that the statement of the conclusion is not really present or past, but that it refers to one of an indefinite series of actions which must extend into the Future. Take, for instance, *Nihil proficiunt mercatores nisi . . . mentiantur*. C. Off. 1, 42.

This obviously does not mean that they *are* not *now* gaining any thing unless they *are* lying. The writer begins as if he would say, that in any assumed case they would not gain unless they should (in that case) lie. By a very natural and common use of the Present in all languages, however, it may refer to that which is true at all

times, including the case supposed. The writer therefore may make the statement general by substituting in the Apodosis for the Present Subjunctive, which would refer to the one case supposed, the Present Indicative referring to this case as well as all others. The same is true of the Perfect in the same construction, except that here the supposed condition is represented as completed before the conclusion.

E. g. Si prohibita impune transcenteris, neque metus ultra neque pudor est. Tac. Ann. 3, 54.

It may be said that the Subjunctive in general conditions in Latin is a Grecism. But our view of the Latin Subjunctive applies equally well to the two dependent moods in Greek, which are used in general conditions in present and past time respectively. The only difference is, that the Greek happens to have two forms not essentially different in meaning, which have grown up at different periods, and have been appropriated, arbitrarily perhaps, to slightly different shades of thought, and especially to variations of tense in the principal clause.

Moreover, notwithstanding the Indicative is the regular form in general conditions in Latin, yet the usage in the case of the second person singular of an indefinite subject shows that the Subjunctive is not entirely foreign to the language in this use. As Madvig has noticed, the second person singular regularly takes the Subjunctive where the subject is indefinite (you, any one) in cases where the other persons would have the Indicative. These usages all come under the head of Protasis and Apodosis, and the general condition in this form is not uncommon. See Madvig (*Eng. Ed.*), Lat. Gr. § 370.

E. g. Quum animum ab istis imaginibus ad veritatem traduxeris, nihil relinquitur. C. Tusc. Qu. 5, 5. Bonus segnior fit ubi negligas

Sall. Jug. 31. Tantum remanet (ætate extrema) quod virtute et recte factis consecutus sis. C. de Sen. 19. Mens quoque et animus nisi tamquam lumini oleum instilles, exstinguuntur senectute. C. ibid. 11. In excitando et in acuendo plurimum valet, si laudes eum quem cohortere. C. Fam. 15, 21. Virtutem necessario gloria, etiamsi tu id non agas, consequitur. C. Tusc. Qu. 1, 38.

This construction of the second person at all events can hardly be an imitation of the Greek. So also in Cato, *Vita humana prope uti ferrum est, si exerceas conteritur*. Cato, *Carmen de moribus*. Jordan (*Reliquiae*), p. 83. The same construction occurs frequently in Sanscrit with the Indefinite Relative. Opt. *Hitopadesa* 800 (Johnson), Conj., *Rig Veda* H. 94, 15. The probability is, that it is a remnant of a construction once common to the two languages, developed in the Greek almost to the exclusion of the Indicative, but restricted in the Latin, for the most part, to the cases where some additional indefiniteness in the expression made its character as a conditional future more clearly felt, as in the case of the indefinite subject, or in cases where the Protasis is dependent upon an infinitive used abstractly. It might well be that the usage afterwards became more frequent from the influence of the Greek. It must be remembered that the cases are rare where a construction wholly foreign to a language becomes firmly established in it from external influence. Almost every one of the Grecisms of the Latin poets are only extensions from Grecian influence of constructions generically the same already existing in the language.

With the general conditions may be compared the use of the Indicative of Verbs denoting propriety, possibility, necessity, wishing, and the like, in the Apodosis of Future conditions, and Present and Past conditions contrary to fact, which is similar in kind, and indeed must have had the same origin. The Verbs thus used are general in their character, and

include the Future as well as the Present. In form, these cases are general conditions (that is, the apodosis is general), but the Protasis is seen by the context to refer to a particular act supposed in the future instead of to any one of an indefinite series of acts.

E. g. Non possum . . . istum accusare si cupiam. C. Verr. 5, 41. Sin autem (hæc omnia) erunt aperta, Cluentio ignoscere debetis. C. Clu. 6. Longum est, si dicere coner. Lucr. 4, 1170. So in past conditions. Quod esse caput debebat si probari posset. C. Fin. 4, 9. See above under the Protasis contrary to fact. See also Madvig, Lat. Gr. § 348, e.

This construction of the general condition transferred to absolute past time gives the Imperfect and Pluperfect Subjunctive in general conditions, commonly called the Subjunctive of repeated action. The apodosis in these cases has the same indefinite relation to past time that the Present has to present time.

E. g. Accusatores, si facultas incideret, pœnis adiciebantur. Tac. Ann. 6, 30.

Each of the forms of Protasis and Apodosis has also its analogue in relative sentences with an indefinite antecedent. These, of course, being nothing more than Protases and Apodoses in another form, need no further analysis, but the examples may be compared with those given above.

E. g. (Conformatio) sententiarum permanet quibuscunque verbis uti velis. C. de Or. 3, 52. Bonus tantummodo segnior fit, ubi negligas. Sall. Jug. 31.

Socrates, is qui . . . quam se cumque in partem dedisset, omnium fuit facile princeps. C. de Or. 3, 16, and very often in the historians.

Haec innumerabilia ex eodem genere qui videat, nonne cogatur çonfiteri deos esse? C. N. D. 2, 4. Philosophia, cui qui pareat, omne tempus ætatis sine molestia possit agere. C. de Sen. 1.

"Condemnas," diceret, qui versum effugere vellet C. Orator. 49. Equidem quaecumque causa vos huc attulisset lætarer. C. de Or. 2, 4.

The above remarks apply also to all uses of the Subjunctive, where the Protasis or the Apodosis is omitted.

Among these are clauses with *tamquam*, *quasi*, *acsi*, *utsi*, *veluti*, *velutsi*, *ceu* and *O si*, where the Apodosis is regularly omitted.

Here belong, also, the Conjunctivus Modestiae, or Subjunctive to soften an assertion, and all Potential uses of the Subjunctive (so called), which are now generally admitted to be elliptical, having a Protasis to be mentally supplied. These therefore need no further analysis.

SUBJUNCTIVE WITH RELATIVES.

Those relative clauses which have an indefinite antecedent, and are therefore equivalent to Protases, have already been treated under Protasis and Apodosis. It only remains to be noticed that these occur with all kinds of relative words, including temporal particles.

E. g. With *cum*; In navigando tempestati obsequi artis est, etiam si portum tenere non queas, cum vero id possis mutata velificatione assequi. C. Fam. 1, 9.

Here the Infinitive form of construction has nothing to do with the mood of *queas* or *possis*, which belong to the principle of the indefinite second person singular mentioned above.

So Cum in jus duci debitorem vidissent undique convolabant. Livy, 2, 27.

Of relative clauses which cannot so be regarded as Protases, there are two kinds: clauses of Purpose (Final Clauses), and clauses of Result (Consecutive Clauses).

The true nature of Final relative clauses in Latin at once appears by a comparison with the Greek. In that language, the Future is regularly used in this construction. (Goodwin, Gr. Moods and Tenses, § 65.)

E. g. Πρεσβείαν δὲ πέμπειν, ἥτις ταῦτ' ἐρεῖ. Now compare the Latin, *Legatos mittere qui dicant*. Here, obviously, the same general idea is expressed, but the Greek says, vividly, "Who will say;" the Latin, "Who would say."

There can be no doubt that the difference is that between a real Future, and a form originally Future, but weakened by its constant use in conditional sentences. The same construction of the dependent moods as in Latin occurs in Sanscrit also. Rig Veda 1, 92, 13. (Conjunctive.) So too the early Greek, and even in special cases the Attic, takes the conditional forms, the Subjunctive and Optative. The former mood is also accompanied by ἄν, which is peculiarly conditional in its meaning. (Goodwin, Gr. M. and T. § 65, N. 2.) We may notice also that in later Latin, and in the Poets, where participles begin more frequently to take the place of clauses, the Future Participle is often used for the relative clause of purpose.

E. g. Laeto complebant litora coetu Visuri Aeneadas. Virg. Aen. 5, 108.

So that the use of the Subjunctive with relatives in Final clauses is only that of a modified Future.

This analysis, of course, includes also the particles *quo* and *quominus*, which are simply relatives introducing final clauses.

Clauses of Result do not admit of so simple an analysis, yet the fact that a result must always be relatively future would at once lead us to suspect that a future was in some way the origin of this construction also. If now we look at the simplest and apparently most primitive forms of this construction we find in all cases a demonstrative in the main clause, of which the character or qualities are defined in the relative clause.

It is obvious that the demonstrative is not strictly such,

as pointing to any particular individual, but is rather a determinative, pointing to one of a class to be afterwards described by the relative. That is, the demonstrative does not mean "this man who (as a fact) does so and so," but "such a man as," or "a man who," described by his qualities. Now how does an action expressed as a quality of a man differ from the same action stated as a fact? The first is evidently what one would do in any case if it arose; the second what one does do in the particular case. The relative clause of quality is then at first merely an apodosis with an indefinite protasis mentally supplied.

E. g. Non sumus ii, quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adjuncta esse dicamus. C. N. D. 1, 5.

How does *videatur* differ here from *videtur*? It is difficult to see any other difference than that *videatur* means originally "would seem in any case," thus expressing a quality of the persons referred to indefinitely by *ii*, while *videtur* would mean, *does* seem in some particular case.

So is (Epicurus) qui ponat summum bonum in voluptate. C. Off. 3, 33. Non sum ego is consul, qui nefas esse arbitrer Gracchos laudare. C. Rull. 2, 5.

In like manner all demonstrative words defined by relatives with the Subjunctive may be analyzed. In some cases, however, the nature of the quality itself is already defined in the antecedent clause, and only its degree is thus determined.

E. g. Nulla gens tam fera . . . cujus mentem non imbuerit deorum opinio. C. Tusc. Q. 1, 13.

Here, instead of "those persons," the demonstrative clause means "those barbarous persons," that is, "that kind of barbarous persons," or simply, "so barbarous." In this case, too, the use of the Perfect is seen, simply

differing from the Present in denoting that the action is completed in the case supposed; that is, the *mentem imbuerit* is just equivalent to *in mente sit*, or some other present of similar meaning. Having established thus the use of the Present and Perfect, we find no difficulty in the Imperfect and Pluperfect, since the latter tenses, in accordance with what has before been said, are only the former transferred to absolutely past time.

After the relative clause has come to be thus used to express a quality of an antecedent demonstrative, there is no difficulty in the omission of the demonstrative. In fact, in these cases the demonstrative idea is always implied, whether expressed or not. Compare *nunc dicis aliquid quod ad rem pertineat* with the not less common *pertinet*. In the first case, although the demonstrative is not expressed, yet *aliquid* is taken in the same determinative sense that *id* would have in a like use; in the second case no such sense is apparent, and the relative clause states a fact about the *aliquid* which itself is conceived as already determined.

After the demonstrative has been omitted the construction is capable of still greater expansion, but still the fundamental idea of a quality remains throughout, although the original apodosis almost entirely disappears, especially in the Perfect and Pluperfect. No one however can doubt that these uses of the Subjunctive are all derived from the simplest forms referred to above.

Compare the use of the Subjunctive in relative clauses after general expressions, both affirmative and negative, which denotes merely the existence or the contrary of the class indefinitely referred to and defined by its qualities. It is to be noticed in this case that the moment the individuals are conceived as already defined, so that the rela-

tive clause expresses not their qualities, but an additional fact about them, the Indicative is used. Notwithstanding this, the Indicative with *sunt qui* in the poets is best regarded as a Grecism in imitation of ἔνιοι, ἔστω ὅι. Compare also the use of the relative after comparatives. The use of the relative in restrictive clauses is an extreme case, where the original idea has almost entirely vanished, but the connection with the *talis ut* principle cannot be mistaken.

Here belongs also the Subjunctive denoting Cause or Reason, so called, though still more remotely connected. In this construction the Apodosis can no longer be detected at all, but there is no difficulty in considering this construction as having the same origin.

E. g. O fortunate adulescens, qui Homerum . . . praeconem inven-
eris. C. Arch. 10.

Here the relative clause gives the occasion for making the exclamation or statement preceding. This cause or reason is expressed however in the form of a quality, so that the meaning is, "O fortunate youth, one who hast found," &c. This meaning is still more obvious when, as is often the case, *ut*, *utpote*, or *quippe* is prefixed to the relative, literally, "as one who." Sometimes the quality expressed by the relative clause is opposed to the main action, so that the relative may be translated by *although* with a demonstrative or personal pronoun. The analysis, however, is the same.

SUBJUNCTIVE AFTER PARTICLES.

From what has been said, the true nature of the clauses with *ut* at once appears. *Ut* or *uti* is only a relative word, probably originally some case of *qui*, expressing a modal

relation, and correlative with the demonstrative *ita*. A Final clause with *ut* is then only a relative clause, expressing purpose, and comes under the same principle as the Relative Final clauses before explained. *Legatos mittit ut dicant*, differs from *Legatos mittit qui dicant*, only that in the former it is the manner of sending that is the antecedent, in the latter it is the ambassadors themselves. One means "in such a manner as they would say," the other "ambassadors who would," &c.

The pure final clauses thus arising afterwards undergo a modification by which they become the objects of verbs of various kinds, among which are verbs of *wishing*, *permission*, *necessity*, *asking*, *advising*, *commanding*, *determining*, *striving*, *fearing*, and in general all verbs whose action is directed towards the future. In these the idea of an apodosis altogether disappears, but the notion of purpose can be distinguished in most of them ; and no one questions that they are all modified purpose clauses.

E. g. *Imperavit ut milites convenirent* must have meant originally, "He commanded in order that the soldiers might assemble," which by a very natural process becomes, "He commanded that the soldiers should assemble."

But the purpose of the command becomes merged in the command itself, and the pure final clause becomes the object of the verb. With many of these verbs the *ut* is omitted after its signification has been lost, so that these clauses are still further disguised. It is this constant omission of *ut* that undoubtedly gives rise to the use of the Subjunctive in Indirect Discourse where it takes the place of the Imperative in Direct. Here the verb also is omitted, inasmuch as it is sufficiently indicated in the general verb which introduces the discourse. Here belongs also the Subjunctive with *licet*, *although*, which is only

licet, it is permitted, losing its verbal force and approaching the force of a conjunction.

Negative clauses of purpose appear with *ne*. The origin of this usage is seen clearly enough from the quite common *ut ne* with the same meaning. In the clauses with *ne* there is simply an omission of the *ut* precisely similar to its omission after *volo, necesse est*, and similar verbs and expressions. Even the *ne* itself is also sometimes omitted with *cave*, whose meaning expresses sufficiently the idea of negative.

In this connection we may consider the use of object clauses after verbs of fearing, as showing the wide variations of which final clauses are capable. Here the use of *ne* for an affirmative and *ut* for a negative object points clearly to the origin of these clauses, in pure final clauses. The idea of purpose has however entirely disappeared.

This usage is instructive also as showing the wide range which the tenses may take in their subsequent development, and thus throws light upon the whole subject. Thus it is perfectly good Latin to say, *Timuit ne hostes venissent* — "He feared the enemy had come;" an expression which presents upon analysis the absurdity of a purpose to prevent a past action. It will be seen that none of the transformations of the tenses we have indicated above are nearly as violent as this, and yet nobody doubts the origin of such object clauses. A very strong confirmation of our view is found in the construction of final and object clauses after particles in Greek. The usage, however, varies in that language, but in such a manner as to show clearly the nature and origin of these constructions. In pure final clauses all the final particles, certainly in their origin relative, or at least demonstratives used as relatives, commonly take the conditional moods, the Sub-

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junctive and Optative. In early Greek the particle *ἄν*, which is peculiarly conditional in character, very often appears with both the Subjunctive and Optative.

The Future Indicative, that is, the more vivid form, occasionally occurs.

With verbs of striving, the Future is regularly used, but the Subjunctive and Optative also frequently appear, and that, too, with the conditional *ἄν*. The Future Optative is rare, and is probably a later formation after the analogy of Indirect Discourse.

After verbs of fearing, the same constructions occur, and *ἄν* (*νε*) is found, but usually, as in Latin, the relative particle is omitted, and the negative *μή* occurs alone. From all these uses the Future character of Final and Object clauses clearly appears. (See Goodwin, *Gr. Moods and Tenses*, §§ 43-46.)

From what has been said of the Subjunctive in relative clauses qualifying an antecedent, usually called clauses of result, the use of *ut* in consecutive clauses is easily analyzed. In the case of *ut* the undefined demonstratives *ita tam*, &c., are explained by their qualities precisely as with the regular relatives. *Non sum ita hebes ut istuc dicam*, then, is precisely parallel with *Non sum is qui istuc dicam*, except that while *is* is an adjective form, *ita* is adverbial or modal, and modifies the adjective *hebes*. The expression amounts to "I am not that kind of a dull man who would say that;" and its character as an Apodosis cannot be denied. Compare such a phrase as *Non sum ita hebes ut videor*. No one can fail to see that *ut* and *ita* are here used in the same sense as before. The verb however differs, and it is easy to see how. *Ut videor* means "as I do seem." *Ut dicam* means, "as I should say;" i.e., "I am not dull in the manner in which I should say this." This quality of the

antecedent readily passes over into a pure result, inasmuch as it is by a supposed result that the quality appears.

After having once been used to denote a result, the Subjunctive may easily be used to express all kinds of results, and the transition to other tenses is easily explained by what has been said before.

From pure consecutive clauses arise a large number of object clauses, but as these are generally recognized as developed clauses of result, no analysis of them is necessary.

Consecutive clauses with *quin* are likewise relative clauses, as that particle is obviously the old ablative *quî* with *ne*, and is equivalent to "by which not," and may be translated in all its uses with the Subjunctive "but that." Of course these cases come under the general principle of relative clauses previously explained, except that the demonstrative antecedent does not appear, but is merged in the main clause.

SUBJUNCTIVE IN TEMPORAL CLAUSES.

The particles of time are all relative, or demonstratives used as relatives, and so might be expected to follow the analogy of other relatives in the clauses they introduce.

Accordingly, *dum*, *donec*, and *quoad*, when they have the accessory idea of purpose, take the Subjunctive as in final clauses with other relatives.

As to all other uses of temporal particles, Prof. Emanuel Hoffmann, of Vienna (Die Constructionen der lateinischen Zeitpartikeln, Vienna, 1860), in a treatise remarkable for breadth of view, keenness of perception, and patient research, has shown the real distinction between the Subjunctive and the Indicative in temporal clauses. By an exhaustive comparison of examples, he makes it clear that

the Subjunctive expresses relative time, while the Indicative expresses absolute time, that is, that the Indicative was used where the time of the temporal clause was conceived as a definite point in the present, past, or future to which time the action of the main clause was referred, but on the other hand, where the temporal clause was intended only as an adjunct or limitation of the time of the main clause, and so not conceived as a definite point of itself, but only as time relative to the main clause, then the Subjunctive was used. *E. g. Loco illo motus est cum est ex urbe depulsus.* Here the time of *depulsus est* is a fixed point referred to as known, and to that time thus fixed, the principal clause is referred. If it were "*Cum esset depulsus,*" or "*pelleretur,*" it would not refer to a point of time considered as known, but would be a limitation of the main clause showing the limit at which or during which it took place. It would occupy too much space to reproduce his discussion, but a reference to the book itself, or a careful comparison of examples, will show that this is the only satisfactory explanation of the use of the Subjunctive with temporal particles. Now this correct view of the practical use, points at once to the origin and the essence of this Subjunctive. If the Subjunctive does not express time as definite, as a particular point in the present, past, or future, but as a limitation of the main clause, then it must describe time by its qualities, or properties, or character, and the relative particles of time are precisely parallel with other relatives, so that there is the same difference between *Cum depulsus est*, and *Cum depulsus esset*, that there is between *is qui depulsus est*, and *is qui depulsus esset*. What this difference is, we have already seen. The first points to a definite individual who as a fact was expelled, the other for some purpose or other expresses the fact as a

property or quality of the antecedent. One is *the* man who was expelled, the other *a* man who was expelled.

Precisely also as the quality expressed by other relative clauses may be used for various purposes, so in temporal clauses the quality of the time may appear to be consonant with the action of the main clause, and so *cum* may pass over into "while" or "since," and *dum*, *dummodo* into "provided ;" or the quality may be at variance with the main action, and *cum* passes into "although."

Quæ cum ita sint, means originally "at a time when these things are so," and only incidentally acquires the idea of cause. A definite, independent time rarely has this meaning, because it is especially the *character* of the time which is to be noticed as consistent or inconsistent with the main fact, but occasionally the mention of the mere time itself is sufficient to show the agreement or variance, and you have the exceptional cases of *cum* causal, and *quando*, with the Indicative. These exceptional cases alone show that the idea of cause has nothing to do with the mood directly. It is only because a causal relation grows more naturally out of time described by its character, than out of a definite fixed time, that the Subjunctive is used at all in these causal sentences.

SUBJUNCTIVE IN INSERTED CLAUSES.

Of the Subjunctives that appear in clauses inserted in others which are themselves dependent, there are three distinct classes. Those inserted in Subjunctive Clauses, those in Infinitive Constructions other than Indirect Discourse, and those in Indirect Discourse proper. The first class being parts of the Protasis or Apodosis, out of which the constructions previously mentioned have grown, would naturally take the same construction.

E. g. Si luce quoque canes latrent, cum deos salutatum aliqui venerint, crura iis suffringantur quod acres sint etiam tum quum suspicio nulla sit. C. Rosc. Am. 20.

Here *venerint* is a part of the Protasis, being supposed as well as the rest, and *sint* and *sit* are parts of the Apodosis, equally depending upon the original supposition. Precisely of the same kind is

Quod me admones, ut me integrum, quoad possim servem gratum est. C. ad Att. 7, 26.

In many cases, however, facts are so inserted, which are true in any event, and are not *themselves* supposed, although something is supposed *about* them, and here the Indicative constantly occurs.

E. g. Eloquendi vis efficit, ut ea quae ignoramus, discere et ea quae scimus alios docere possimus. C. N. ad. 2, 59.

In many such cases it is immaterial whether the dependent clause be conceived in one way or the other, and either form may be used. It is, however, to be noticed that the influence of the Indirect Discourse proper is often seen in this kind of clauses, for which see farther on.

Those clauses inserted in the Infinitive Construction not Indirect Discourse, are for the most part Protases with indefinite relatives.

Mos est Athenis laudari in contione eos qui sint in praeliis interfecti. C. Or. 44.

Here *qui* is equivalent to *si qui*, which indeed often occurs, and the Subjunctive is used as in the Protasis of general conditions. *

This construction includes all verbs which take the infinitive alone, as well as those which admit the subject accusative, but whose action is directed towards the future,

such as verbs of wishing, commanding, permission, and the like. In all these cases, however, the Subjunctive is sometimes to be referred to the real or informal Indirect Discourse, as will presently be seen.

The real Indirect Discourse is, however, of a different nature, and may be regarded as an Apodosis. It will be noticed that in this form of speech the statement quoted is put into an abstract form by the use of the Infinitive, the most abstract form that the verb as such can have. Now if this main clause is modified by dependent clauses, if these were put in the Indicative as present or past facts, the modifiers would be stated absolutely on the authority of the writer, while the main part of the statement would be in an entirely abstract form. Now what more natural than that the modifying clauses should be stated as conclusions upon a supposed condition such as, "if we believe the author," or something of that kind? That is, they are stated, not as facts, but as what would be true, if we should accept the statement of the speaker. Nor are we without analogies to support this view. The French conditional is often equivalent to "it is said." See *Archiv. f. d. Stud. d. Neu. Spr.* XLIV. 4, 435.

E. g. Le nombre des delits s'est fort accru dans ce dernier temps. Ainsi il aurait (it is said to have) à peu pres doublé pendant les vingt cinq dernieres années. "Quand je parle de la police Anglaise" se serait il crié, (Garibaldi) "j'ote mon chapeau."

In German, the verb *sollen* is used in the same manner. *Er soll krank sein, He is said to be, &c.* The primitive idea of *sollen* is obligation, passing over into various shades of necessary dependence upon external or internal influences. Now in this use upon what does the obligation or necessity depend? Obviously upon the trustworthiness of the report, so that this expression of necessity comes to

convey the idea of an uncertain rumor. So also *skall* and *skulde* were thus used in Anglo Saxon. This use of *sollen* and *skall* is especially valuable as showing the ease with which an idea essentially future comes to acquire the idea of uncertainty in the present or past.

In comparing the Greek use of the dependent moods in Indirect Discourse, the only thing noticeable is that, in present time the statement was so near the mind of the writer and reader that no such condition was necessary; but as soon as the statement quoted was to be referred to as made in past time, the Optative or *conditional* form was regularly employed. The same phenomenon occurs in the German Subjunctive also.

This view of the Subjunctive of Indirect Discourse accounts for the constant recurrence of the Indicative, contrary to the general rule. This no doubt happens, because when a fact is known to be such by the writer and his readers the conditional form is felt to be unnecessary, and this feeling prevails over the general usage.

E. g. Putabat (Marius) ea quae gesserat posse celebrari. C. Arch. 9.

So also very often in the historians, to whom the truth of the facts spoken of would be especially known.

From this usage in the regular indirect discourse, which must have speedily lost the consciousness of its origin, and become purely idiomatic, comes finally the informal indirect discourse, by which the words or thoughts of any other person than the writer, and even of the writer himself under other circumstances, assume the indirect form. The tendency of this principle to assert itself even where it is logically unnecessary is seen in the use of the Subjunctive of verbs of thinking, saying, &c., which by their signification already show that the remark is quoted.

E. g. Quum enim Hannibalis permissu exisset de castris, rediit paulo post quod se oblitum nescioquid diceret. C. Off. 1, 13.

This construction accordingly acquires a very wide range, and is seen in many clauses inserted in final and consecutive clauses, and in the infinitive constructions which are not indirect discourse proper.

E. g. Caesar petit a Roscio, quoniam Pompeii mandata ad se detulerit, ne gravetur sua quoque ad eum postulata deferre.

Here *detulerit* is not a part of the purpose clause, but is a part of Cæsar's words, and therefore takes the Subjunctive.

E. g. Rex imperavit, ut quae bello opus essent pararentur.

Here *essent* may stand for *sunt* or for *erunt*. If for *sunt*, the inserted clause is indirect discourse, if for *erunt* it is a part of the final clause *ut pararentur*, i.e., *Parate ea quae sunt*, or *quae erunt* in the direct command.

INDIRECT QUESTION.

From the Indirect Discourse comes also the Indirect Question. There can be no doubt that this construction is relative in its origin. Compare the French, which always inserts the demonstrative before the interrogative (relative).

E. g. Je vous demande ce que vous faites.

Compare the regular use in Greek of relative forms in the indirect question instead of interrogatives.

E. g. Τίς ἐστίν; Οὐκ οἶδα ὅστις ἐστίν.

Now if this view is correct, then *Dic mihi quid facias* is really equivalent to *id quod facias*, and *facias* has become Subjunctive under the principle last above referred to. Compare such sentences as, —

Demonstrabantur mihi praeterea quae Socrates . . . disseruisset.
C. de Sen. 21.

The fact also is to be noticed that the Subjunctive in indirect questions seems to be of comparatively late origin, as in the earlier writers the usage is by no means settled. We may observe, too, the frequent attraction of the main word of the question into the principal clause, an irregularity peculiar to relative clauses, and which could hardly arise from a real interrogative clause.

E. g. Scipio . . . profectus . . . ad copias, quantae et cujus generis essent, speculandas. Livy, 21, 46.

The only uses remaining to be analyzed are the Hortatory and Optative Subjunctive, and the Dubitative Subjunctive, or that used in questions of doubt, indignation, and negation. These have been commonly explained by an ellipsis of some word meaning to wish with *ut*, which is probable on some grounds. One, which I have not seen noticed, is that in the Optative construction the Imperfect and Pluperfect have the same accessory notion of impossibility that belongs to those tenses in Protasis and Apodosis. This would agree perfectly with the use of *velim*, *vellem*, &c., which occur so often. These words are Apodoses to a supposed Protasis, *velim* meaning, "I should wish if I may be allowed to do so," or something of that kind, *vellem* meaning, "I should wish if it were possible," implying that it is not. The dependent clause would naturally follow the tense of the main clause, and when that disappeared, the Imperfect and Pluperfect would be left with the same implication that belonged to the whole expression. *Utinam essem*, therefore would stand for *Vellem utinam essem*, which implies the impossibility of the thing

wished for. *Nam*, it is to be noticed, is only "*namely*," the Sanscrit *nâma*.

If this view of all such Subjunctives is correct, they are explained by the analysis of final clauses already given.

It is, however, more probable that these are independent sentences. The same usage runs through all the languages of this stock. In the Vedas, these constructions are used with the Conjunctive in all the forms in which they appear afterwards in Greek and Latin, and it is highly improbable that at that early period the ellipsis should have already taken place, and have left no trace of the omitted main clause. (See Rig Veda, 1, 48, 12, for an example in connection with the Imperative.) More than half the Conjunctives in the First Book of the Rig Veda are of this description.

So, too, the regular first person of the Imperative of the Indo-European languages is obviously of the same formation as the Sanscrit Conjunctive. (Schleicher Comp. § 269, § 288; Bopp Vergl. Gr. § 722, p. 990.) Some languages, as the Lithuanian and Slavonic, take the Optative for their Imperative. (Bopp, § 677, p. 930; § 679, p. 932.) The use of the Future for the Imperative is not uncommon in most languages, and it is perhaps better to consider the Hortatory and similar Subjunctives, as original developments from the future signification of the mood. The Dubitative Subjunctive especially seems to admit of this explanation.

E. g. Cum tempestate pugnem, potius quam illi obtemperem? C. Planc. 39.

Without the question, this would be "I would fight (if necessary or if the case should occur)". With the question, I can see no difference in meaning. It is to be

noticed, that this form of question always refers to the future. And we may compare the use of the Future in rhetorical questions.

E. g. Nos hunc Heracleensem . . . de nostra civitate eiciemus?
C. Arch. 10.

Here there seems no more difference between the Subjunctive and the Future than between a conditional and an unconditional future. So again, —

Quid hoc homine faciatis. C. Verr. 2, 16,

can hardly be distinguished from a future.

It would be quite in accordance with the genius of the language, and with the relations of the tenses to each other, as they have thus far appeared, that this same construction should be transferred to the Imperfect and Pluperfect with the same meaning relative to past time.

E. g. An ego non venirem! C. Phil. 2, 2. Quid enim dicerem.
C. Att. 6, 3.

On the other hand the analogy of the later Greek (Goodw. § 88), and the occasional occurrence of such expressions as, *Quid vis faciam?* point to the explanation of these as dependent clauses. In either case, however, the usage is consistent with the view of the Subjunctive here adopted.

Ut, with the Subjunctive denoting a concession, I have not yet been able to analyze except by an ellipsis, making it thereby an object clause (originally of purpose). I confess, however, this is not entirely satisfactory, and some better explanation may hereafter be arrived at. Inasmuch as the phrase is used as a Protasis, there is no probability that any view can be taken of it inconsistent with what has been said of the mood generally.

Without going too deeply into Comparative Grammar proper, that is, the analysis of the forms, which I hope to do more at length hereafter, I may notice that this view agrees very well with so much of the science of the forms as is well established.

The Present Subjunctive is the only one of the tenses in Latin that is original, and has its types in the other languages of the stock, and at the same time it contains in its different forms the analogues of both the original moods, the Subjunctive and Optative. *Sim, velim*, and the old forms in *im*, together with the Subjunctive of the 1st Conj., are akin to the old Optative and the Greek Optative. *Sit* (earlier *siet*) corresponds to *syât* and *εἴη*; *edit* to *adyât*, *stet* (shortened from *staiet* probably, Oscan *staiet*) to *israîn*, and Sanscrit *tisthet*, having lost its reduplication. This mood inserts *yâ*, *iya*, or *i*, between the root and the personal endings. This element most grammarians agree in deriving from the root *i*, to go; in fact, the same element which formed the obsolete Future of the stock, appearing only in composition as *syami*, whence comes the Latin *ero*, and the *s* of the Greek and other futures. Bopp, § 672, p. 926 *et seq.*; Curtius Temp. u. Modi, p. 250 *et seq.*

The remaining forms of the Present are more probably akin to the Greek Subjunctive and Vedic Conjunctive. This form inserts an *a* at the end of the root of the Present, though there are isolated forms which, as in the Homeric Subjunctive, retain the short vowel (a single short *a*) of the Indicative. Thus *ferat* would correspond to *bharâti*, and *φέρη(σι)*. Of this *a* no satisfactory meaning has yet been suggested; but it is identified with the *a* that is added to the simple root to produce the Present in use of four classes of verbs in Sanscrit. The probability is, that it is a Present or Aorist emphasized and developed into a Fu-

ture, as so often in all languages the Present is used for the Future. Thus two distinct moods are represented in the Latin Present Subjunctive, which, although nicely distinguished in Greek, yet appear in Sanscrit used indiscriminately side by side. This confusion seems to exclude the idea that the two are generically different in meaning, though their formal origin is not the same, and their use in Greek in the advanced state of the language was of a twofold character.

The other tenses of the Latin Subjunctive are later, and are peculiar to that language; and this fact agrees well with what has been said of the gradual development of constructions.

Thus it is seen, that all the uses of the Subjunctive can be accounted for naturally upon the supposition, that the mood was originally merely future in its meaning, and only by development came to have a modal signification, a supposition which is not inconsistent with its formal origin, so far as that is known. If this view should be accepted, it is hoped that such an analysis, even though it should not prove to be correct in all particulars, may give a more rational character to the treatment of the Subjunctive than has heretofore been usual, and that some impetus may be given to the study of Comparative Grammar, which seems to have been too much neglected in this country compared with the attention it has received in Europe.

